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Long-distance continuous-variable quantum key
distribution with quantum scissors
Masoud Ghalaii, Carlo Ottaviani, Rupesh Kumar, Stefano Pirandola, and Mohsen Razavi
Abstract—We investigate the use of quantum scissors, as can-
didates for non-deterministic amplifiers, in continuous-variable
quantum key distribution. Such devices rely on single-photon
sources for their operation and as such, they do not necessarily
preserve the Guassianity of the channel. Using exact analytical
modeling for the system components, we bound the secret key
generation rate for a protocol that uses quantum scissors. We
find that, for certain non-zero values of excess noise, such
a protocol can reach longer distances than the counterpart
with no amplification. This sheds light into the prospect of
using quantum scissors as an ingredient in continuous-variable
quantum repeaters.




UANTUM key distribution (QKD) [1–3] addresses the
problem of sharing secret keys between two users. Such
keys can then be used for secure communications. While
original QKD protocols [2–5] rely on encoding classical bits of
information in discrete quantum states, such as the polarization
of single photons, one can also exploit continuous-variable
QKD (CV QKD) protocols, where the bits are encoded on the
quadratures of light [6–9]. In particular, the recent progress in
CV QKD systems has placed them in a competitive position
with their conventional discrete-variable counterparts [10, 11].
For instance, contrary to discrete-variable QKD protocols,
which require single-photon detectors, CV QKD uses coherent
measurement schemes, such as homodyne and/or heterodyne
detection, to measure light quadratures, compatible with high-
rate coherent telecommunications systems [12–14]. Moreover,
CV QKD protocols can be the better choice over short dis-
tances than the metropolitan zones [11]. Once it comes to
long distances, however, CV QKD has its own challenges to
compete with discrete-variable QKD [15]. This paper exam-
ines how the security distance can be enhanced in CV QKD
systems by using realistic non-deterministic amplification [16].
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One of the proposed solutions to improve the rate-versus-
distance performance of CV QKD protocols is to use noiseless
linear amplifiers (NLAs) [16, 17]. It is known that determinis-
tic amplification cannot be noise free [18]. An NLA can only
then work probabilistically. This inevitably reduces the key
rate by a factor corresponding to the success rate of the NLA,
which implies that, at short distances, the use of NLAs may
not be beneficial. The key rate may, however, increase at long
distances because of the improvement in the signal to noise
ratio. That is, while the number of data points we can use for
key extraction is less, the quality of the remaining points could
be also high, such that a larger number of secret key bits can
be extracted. This has been shown theoretically by treating
the NLA as a probabilistic, but noiseless, black box, where
an upper bound on success probability, 1/g2 with g being the
amplification gain, was used [16].
The story can be quite different when we replace the
above ideal NLA with realistic systems that offer NLA-like
functionality. For instance, one of the most basic structures
for an NLA is a quantum scissor (QS), which combines the
incoming light with a single photon [19, 20]. While under
weak signal assumptions, a QS can be approximated as an
NLA, more precise analysis reveals that its operation is not
necessarily noiseless. This is particularly important because in
many CV QKD protocols the transmitted signal does not have
a fixed intensity, and realistic NLAs often treat different input
signals differently. This is more or less true for other proposals
that implement the NLA operation [21–26].
In this paper, we provide a realistic account of what a
QS can offer within a CV QKD setup. In particular, using
an exact model for the QS setup, we analyze the secret key
rate of a Gaussian modulated protocol, whose receiver unit
is equipped with a QS. One of the implications of our exact
modeling for the QS is that we cannot directly apply standard
key rate calculation techniques that rely on the Gaussianity
of the output states. This will make the exact calculation of
the key rate cumbersome. We manage this problem by using
relevant bounds for certain components of the key rate. We
investigate the extent at which the use of quantum scissors
can increase the security distance in CV QKD systems.
One of our key incentives for carrying out the above analysis
is to provide insights into the applicability of other proposals
for CV quantum repeaters [27–29] for QKD operation. The
QS-equipped CV QKD link that we consider here contains the
elementary repeater (error correction) link used in the repeater
setup of [27], and as such a poor performance for this basic
building block could cast shadow on the usefulness of any





























Fig. 1. A two-leg quantum repeater module as proposed in [27]. Each leg is
composed of an EPR source generating two-mode squeezed vacuum states, a
quantum scissor (QS), and two quantum memory (QM) units. Beam splitters
with transmissivity T characterize the loss in each leg, with excess noise
represented by ε. Upon successful operation of the QS in each leg, the output
of the QS and the EPR source are stored in respective quantum memories.
When both legs are ready, a joint dual homodyne (Dual Hom) measurement
is performed on the quantum states stored in QM2 and QM3, which swaps
entanglement to QM1 and QM4.
links. In the repeater setup of [27], CV teleportation is
used to swap entanglement between already entangled links,
represented by QM1-QM2 and QM3-QM4 in Fig. 1. Each
of such links have been entangled by sending one half of a
two-mode squeezed vacuum state, represented by EPR boxes,
through a lossy channel. The received signal will then be
amplified, in a probabilistic way, by the QS module, and will
be stored in the corresponding quantum memory (QM). Note
that, considering the non-deterministic behavior of the QS,
use of QM modules is necessary if we want to achieve any
rate enhancement from our repeater setup. The dual homodyne
module will then effectively perform entanglement swapping
in the CV domain once both links have had successful QS
operations.
Note that the above repeater setup must use a physical
QS implementation, and not a virtual one, in order to offer
any rate advantage. That is, the class of measurement-based
NLA (MB-NLA) implementations [30–32], which rely on data
post-selection, would not be suitable for such CV repeaters.
Due to reliance of MB-NLAs on classical post-selection,
the state of QM2 and QM4 must effectively be measured
before the entanglement swapping can be done. Even if we
do not consider the applications of our considered setup in
CV repeater settings, one must be cautious with typically
poor success probability of MB-NLAs compared to that of
physical NLAs [33]. This suggests that the use of physical
NLAs in CV QKD systems is still of interest, and, in fact,
one may favour a physical realization of an NLA over its
virtual post-measurement implementation due to restrictions
on the MB-NLA [34]. Our work here would shed more light
into the applicability of such physical realizations by offering
an accurate analysis of the underlying system.
The manuscript is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we
describe details of the proposed system. In Sec. III, by
analyzing input-output characteristic functions of a single QS,
we calculate the exact output state and success probability of
the QS NLA in [20]. We also study the non-Gaussian behavior
of this system. In Sec. IV, we present the key rate analysis of
the CV QKD link with a single QS as part of its receiver.
In Sec. V, we discuss the numerical results. Finally, Sec. VI
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe our proposed setup for the QS-
amplified CV QKD protocol. We assume that the sender, Alice
(A), is connected to the receiver, Bob (B), via a quantum
𝜇
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Fig. 2. (a) Schematic view of CV QKD link with an additional quantum
scissor at the receiver. (b) Entanglement-based CV QKD protocol equivalent
to (a). Hom and Het represent, respectively, the homodyne detection and
heterodyne detection modules.
channel; see Fig. 2(a). The protocol runs along the same
lines as proposed by Grosshans and Grangier in 2002 (GG02)
[6, 7, 35, 36]. That is, in every round, Alice transmits a
coherent state |α〉 to Bob, where α = xA + ipA, with real
parameters xA and pA being chosen randomly according to


















where VA is the modulation variance in the shot-noise units. At
the receiver, however, we equip Bob with a single QS before
the homodyne module used in GG02. Upon a successful QS
operation, Bob randomly chooses to measure x̂B = âB+â
†
B or
p̂B = (âB − â†B)/i, where âB represents the annihilation op-
erator for the output mode of the QS. During the sifting stage,
Bob would then publicly declare his measurement choices
as well as the rounds in which the QS has been successful.
Alternatively, one can use the equivalent entanglement-based
(EB) scheme of Fig. 2(b), where Alice’s source is replaced
with an EPR source followed by heterodyne detection on
one of the two modes of the state (by EPR source we mean
a two-mode squeezed vacuum state [9]). In either case, we
assume that Bob can reconstruct, in an error-free way, the
phase reference for the local oscillator used in his homodyne
detection. By using post-processing techniques, Alice and Bob
extract a key from the subset of data for which the QS has
been successful.
Quantum scissors are the main building blocks in the
NLA proposed by Ralph and Lund [20]. At the core of a
QS, there is a partial Bell-state measurement (BSM) module,
with a balanced beam splitter followed by two single-photon
detectors, in the space spanned by number states |0〉 and |1〉.
This BSM module is driven by an asymmetric entangled state
|ψ〉 = √µ |1〉ĉ|0〉b̂3 +
√
1− µ |0〉ĉ|1〉b̂3 , generated by a single
photon that goes through a beam splitter with transmittance µ;
see Fig. 3. For an input state in the |0〉-|1〉 space, the QS could
then offer an asymmetric teleportation functionality, whenever
the BSM operation is successful, i.e., when only one of D1
or D2 detector in Fig. 3 clicks. For instance, in the particular



























Fig. 3. The schematic diagram of a quantum scissor. Here, we assume that
an on-demand ideal single-photon source (SPS) is in use, and that the single-
photon detectors have unity efficiencies.
with |α| ≪ 1, a single click could come from the single-
photon component in the entangled state |ψ〉 and/or the input
state. In that case, the output state, after renormalization, can
be approximated by |0〉b̂3 + αg|1〉b̂3 ≈ |αg〉b̂3 , for |gα| ≪ 1,
where g =
√
(1− µ)/µ represents the amplification gain of
the QS. Under these assumptions, the success probability for
the QS operation is given by PRLsucc(α) ≈ µ+(1−µ)|α|2. Note
that, in the above description, the essential assumption for a
QS to possibly operate as an NLA is that |α| ≪ 1.
There are two reservations in using the above asymptotic
approach for analyzing a QS-based CV QKD system. First,
note that the output state of a QS is always in the space
spanned by single-photon and vacuum states. By approximat-
ing the output state as a coherent state, we are introducing
some errors, which can affect the security of the system. More
precisely, the transition from a coherent state to a single-
photon state is a non-Gaussian one, whose effect must be
carefully considered in the security analysis. Secondly, in the
GG02 protocol, the coherent states are chosen randomly via
Gaussian distributions; hence, the input states to the QS may
not necessarily satisfy the assumption |α| ≪ 1.
In order to resolve the above issues, in our work, we find the
exact output state and probability of success for an arbitrary
coherent state at the input of a QS. This will be detailed in
Sec. III. We note that one can implement a QS/NLA which
truncates input states to first N Fock states [37, 38]. Here
we limit ourselves to the single-photon truncation. We then
apply our findings to the key rate analysis of a QS-equipped
CV QKD system. For simplicity, we assume that the required
single-photon source (SPS) in the QS is ideal and on-demand.
Single-photon detector efficiencies are also assumed to be
unity. Our analysis can, nevertheless, be extended to account
for the imperfections in the source and detectors.
III. QUANTUM SCISSORS: INPUT-OUTPUT RELATIONSHIP
In this section, we first obtain an exact input-output relation-
ship for a QS driven by a coherent state. We use characteristic
functions to model the input and output states. For a joint,
M -mode, state ρ̂, where each mode j is represented by an an-
nihilation operator âj , the antinormally-ordered characteristic
function is given by





























Fig. 4. The quantum channel and the QS are considered as a combined system
with input modes â1 − â3 and âN and output modes b̂1 − b̂3 and b̂N. The
transformation matrix of the system is given by (4).




antinormally-ordered displacement operator with ξ∗ being the
complex conjugate of the complex number ξ = ξr + iξi,
with ξr and ξi are real numbers. The density matrix ρ̂ and
its antinormally-ordered characteristic function are connected














where D̂N(â, ξ) = e
ξâ†e−ξ








In the following, we use the above formulation to analyze
the setup in Fig. 4, which includes a QS driven by an arbitrary
coherent state through a lossy channel with transmissivity T
and excess noise ε.
A. Pre-measurement state
For the setup in Fig. 4, we can use the well-known relation-
ships for beam splitters to relate the four input modes to the
four output modes. The dashed box Γ is a linear optics circuit,
for which such input-output relationships can be obtained.
In particular, considering the input modes represented by
AT = [â1 â2 â3 âN] and output modes BT = [b̂1 b̂2 b̂3 b̂N],
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is a unitary orthogonal matrix, i.e., ΓT = Γ−1. The output
antinormally-ordered characteristic function can then be ex-
pressed in terms of the input one by










=χinA (λ1, λ2, λ3, λN), (5)
4
where [λ1 λ2 λ3 λN]
T = ΓT[ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξN]
T, with ΓT being
the transpose of Γ. Here, we make use of the fact that
D̂A(sâ, ξ) = D̂A(â, sξ), s ∈ ❘, and 〈D̂A(â, ξ1)D̂A(â, ξ2)〉 =
eξ1ξ
∗
2 〈D̂A(â, ξ1 + ξ2)〉.
Next, we consider the particular input state









πε/2 , with ε being the channel excess noise.
This corresponds to a Gaussian attack by Eve, enabled by an
entangling cloner [39], which we later use in forthcoming sec-
tions. For the above set of input states, the output characteristic
function has the following expression






By using the transformation matrix Γ, this can be re-written
as the following






































(1− µ)/µ , τ =
√
(1− T )/T , and Im[ξ] being
the imaginary part of complex number ξ. Using (3), the joint














χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξN)
D̂N(b̂1, ξ1)D̂N(b̂2, ξ2)D̂N(b̂3, ξ3)D̂N(b̂N, ξN). (9)
We can next trace out mode b̂N to obtain the joint state of











χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, 0)
D̂N(b̂1, ξ1)D̂N(b̂2, ξ2)D̂N(b̂3, ξ3), (10)
where



























4 (1 − T )ε. Note that εrec = (1 − T )ε is




4Tεtm, where εtm = εrec/T is the amount of excess noise
at the transmitter.
B. Post-selected state
Following [20], we consider a QS to be successful if only
one detector in Fig. 4 clicks. In order to model such mea-
surements we use the following non-resolving measurement
operator
M̂ = (✶− |0〉1〈0|)⊗ |0〉2〈0|, (12)
which corresponds to the case where detector D1 clicks while

















χoutA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, 0)
× (πδ2(ξ1)− 1)D̂N(b̂3, ξ3), (13)
where δ2(ξ) = δ(ξr)δ(ξi) and P
PS = tr(M̂ρ̂out) is the
corresponding (success) probability of the measurement M̂ ,
which will be calculated in Sec. III-C.
Because the truncated post-measurement state lives in the
qubit subspace spanned by number states {|0〉b̂3 , |1〉b̂3}, the
output state has the form
ρ̂PSout(α) =ρ00(α)|0〉b̂3〈0|+ ρ01(α)|0〉b̂3〈1|
+ ρ10(α)|1〉b̂3〈0|+ ρ11(α)|1〉b̂3〈1|, (14)
where ρjk(α) = b̂3〈j|ρ̂
PS




































We remark that in the case that only detector D2 clicks, the
QS is still considered successful. After working out the post-
selected output state, we find that the result has the same form
as in (14), but we only need to replace α with −α in (15).
In practice, in a QKD setup, Bob can negate its measurement
results whenever this happens. One can also use a unitary
operation to correct the output state so that we always end up
with (14) as the post-selected state.
We note that the post-measurement state is Hermitian and
positive-semidefinite, as expected. In addition, in the limit of
|gα| ≪ 1, we can verify that the post-selected state of the
single QS approaches the weak coherent state |gα〉.
C. Probability of success
The probability of success for measurement M̂ and input




















2 + 2F1(2F1 + 1) + T |α|2
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where Psucc(α) is the total probability of success for the QS
module, i.e., when either of D1 or D2 detector clicks. As
expected, Psucc(α) approaches, to first-order approximation,
to PRLsucc(α) = µ+ (1− µ)|α|2 = (1 + |gα|2)/(1 + g2), when
|α| ≪ 1, at ε = 0 and T = 1.
This approximation is, however, invalid even when we
slightly deviate from the condition on |α|, as can be seen
in Fig. 5(a). Here, we have plotted the exact probability of
success, Psucc(α), versus |α|2 and g, and compared it with
the asymptotic value obtained by Ralph and Lund, PRLsucc(α).
It can be seen that the exact probability of success is always
lower than the asymptotic value, and the difference is visible at
all values of g. The success probability also increases with the
decrease in g. For |α| ≪ 1, the success probability approaches
its maximum possible value of 1/g2 [18]. But, again, as can
be seen in Fig. 5(b), we quickly deviate from this ideal regime
when |α| increases. This indicates that we cannot operate at
maximum possible success probability for all possible inputs,
as assumed in [16], if we use a QS as an NLA.
In Fig. 5(b), the maximum possible success probability,
1/g2, divides the plot into two regions. There is a region in
which the success probability is above the maximum possible
for an NLA. This implies that the QS operation should be
very noisy in this region, hence breaking the assumption on
the noise-free operation of the NLA. If we want to work in
the region that Psucc(α) < 1/g
2, we will then have to deal
with limitations on the maximum gain that we can choose
for the range of input states we may expect. This indicates a
trade-off between the amount of noise that the QS may add to
the signal versus its gain and success probability. We will later
address this issue, in the context of CV QKD, in our numerical
results when we optimize the secret key generation rate over
the system parameters.
D. Non-Gaussian behavior of the QS
Before calculating the secret key generation rate of a QS-
equipped CV QKD system, it is necessary to better understand
the nature of a quantum channel that includes a QS module.
This is important because the majority of results on the secret
key rate of CV QKD systems rely on Gaussian characteristics
of the channel [35, 41]. This is not, however, the case for a
QS module as we see in this section.
In order to examine the non-Gaussian behavior of the
QS output, let us focus on the distribution of homodyne
measurement results on quadrature x̂B . Let us also consider
an input coherent state |α〉, with α = xA + ipA as distributed
by (1), at the QS port â1. That results in a thermal state








Fig. 5. (a) The exact success probability of a single QS (lower red), Psucc,
and that based on approximations in [20] (upper blue), PRLsucc. (b) The
exact success probability of a single QS (red), Psucc, and that of an ideal
NLA (grey), upper bounded by 1/g2, versus average photon number and
amplification gain. In all cases, ε = 0 and T = 1.
performing similar calculations, the post-selected state will be
given by





























4T (VA + εtm).
The probability distribution for obtaining a real number xB
after measuring x̂B , conditional on the success of the QS, is
6
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
x
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Fig. 6. The output distribution at the receiver side (solid-black), which
comprises Gaussian (dashed blue) and non-Gaussian (dot-dashed red) parts.
Here, g = 2, VA = 0.05, ε = 0, and T = 1.
then given by











where x̂B |xB〉 = xB |xB〉.
The expression for fXB (xB) will then have two compo-
nents: one is a Gaussian term in xB proportional to σ00(VA),
and the other is a non-Gaussian term proportional to σ11(VA).
Fig. 6 shows the contribution of each of these components in
making fXB (xB) at g = 2, VA = 0.05, ε = 0, and T = 1.
We notice that even for such a small modulation variance,
which corresponds mostly to small values of |α|, the non-
Gaussian term is quite distinct. Higher amplification gains
could even result in more deviation from a Gaussian state.
This non-Gaussian behavior would have ramifications on the
key rate analysis of a QS-based system as we see next.
IV. SECRET KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we use the results in Sec. III to determine
the secret key rate of the GG02 protocol when Bob uses a
single QS before his homodyne measurement. We find the
secret key rate in a nominal operation condition when no
eavesdropper is present. We, however, assume a thermal loss
channel with transmissivity T , modeled by a beam splitter, and
an excess noise ε. This can effectively be thought as having
an eavesdropper who attempts a Gaussian attack [42]. That is,
we assume that Eve employs an entangling cloner by coupling
one component of a TMSV state with Alice’s signal, while
retaining the other part for her future measurements. If one
traces out the latter part of the TMSV state that Eve would
keep for herself, the state on the other part would be a thermal
state. The effective impact of Eves attack on the channel will
then be equivalent to coupling Alices signal with a thermal
state, which is the same as using a thermal-loss channel for
analysing the secret key rate, as we have pursued in this work.
It is important to note that such an attack may not be the
optimal one for our non-Gaussian channel, but considering
how close the output distribution in Fig. 6 is to a Gaussian
distribution, the results obtained for this particular channel
should not be far away from that obtained in an optimal
attack [43]. The secret key rate of CV QKD protocols in the
asymptotic limit of infinitely many signals is given by
K = βIAB − χBE, (22)
where β, IAB, χBE are, respectively, the reconciliation effi-
ciency, the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and
eavesdropper’s accessible information when reverse reconcili-
ation is used.
In our proposed setup, since the QS operation is non-
deterministic, the whole key rate formula should be multiplied
by the average success probability of the QS, P succ, where the
averaging is performed over all possible inputs. Therefore, the
secret key rate reads
KQS ≥ P succ(βI⋆AB − χ⋆BE), (23)
where ‘⋆’ indicates that the mutual and Holevo information
terms are calculated for the post-selected data when the
QS is successful. The measurement results corresponding to
unsuccessful QS events will be discarded at the sifting stage.
The fact that we only use the post-selected data for key
extraction implies that we have to account for the non-
Gaussianity of the QS output states. Unfortunately, the non-
Gaussian behavior of the QS makes conventional methods for
key rate calculation inapplicable. In order to take the non-
Gaussian effects into account, we calculate the exact mutual
information by directly using the conditional distribution of
the QS output. Ideally one could also look for the exact
calculation of the Holevo information term as well. But, this
turns out to be extremely cumbersome. Instead, in this paper,
we find an upper bound for the Holevo information term by
finding the covariance matrix (CM) of the output state from the
total channel and then calculate the Holevo information for a
Gaussian state with the same CM. The reason is that Gaussian
collective attacks are proven to be optimal in the sense that
they maximize the Holevo quantity [41] of fixed CM for the
output shared state. Given the generality of the results in [41],
in a real experiment, once we obtain the CM terms from the
measurement results, we can use the same methodology to
obtain a lower bound on the key rate.
In the following, we provide more detail on how each of
the terms in (23) can be calculated.
A. Mutual information
The mutual information between two random variables XA
and XB , corresponding to post-selected data on Alice’s and
Bob’s sides, is the difference between the entropy function
H(XB) and the conditional entropy H(XB |XA) [44]:









dxAdxBf(xA, xB) log2 fXB (xB |xA),
(26)
with f(xA, xB) = fXA(xA)fXB (xB |xA) being the joint
probability density function.
Here, fXB (xB) can be obtained by using (21), while the
conditional output distribution fXB (xB |xA) can be obtained
as follows:
fXB (xB |xA) = tr(ω̂PSout(xA)|xB〉〈xB |), (27)
where the conditional output state ω̂PSout(xA) is calculated in
Appendix A. In our work, we numerically carry out the above
integrals for a given set of parameters.
B. Holevo information
In order to calculate the Holevo information term, χ⋆BE, we
use the EB description of the protocol, where one part of an
EPR state travels through the quantum channel and amplified
by a QS, while the other is measured by Alice; see Fig. 7. In
order to upper bound χ⋆BE, what we need is then the CM of
Alice-Bob bipartite state. We will then first derive the exact
post-selected joint state, from which the CM parameters can
be obtained. We use a similar approach to Sec. III in using
characteristic functions to find a relationship between Alice
and Bob states when the QS is successful. As shown in Fig. 7,
we also account for the effect of the quantum channel loss and
excess noise in our calculations.
By using (2) and the transformation matrix Γ, we can
now write the full output antinormally-ordered characteristic
function, including â0 mode, in terms of the input one by
χoutA (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξN) = χ
in
A (λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3, λN), where





[λ0 λ1 λ2 λ3 λN],
with χinA (λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3, λN) = χ
EPR
A (λ0, λ1) ×
χinA (λ2, λ3, λN), where χ
EPR
A (λ0, λ1) = exp{−δ2(|λ0|2 +
|λ1|2) − 2Re(δγλ∗0λ∗1)} is the antinormally-ordered
characteristic function of the EPR state with parameters
δ and γ =
√
δ2 − 1 , and Re[ξ] being the real part of the
complex number ξ. The term χinA (λ2, λ3, λN) is calculated
for input state |1〉â2〈1| ⊗ |0〉â3〈0| ⊗
∫
d2βfε(β)|β〉âN〈β|.
Putting all this together, we then find the pre-measurement
antinormally-ordered characteristic function for modes â0, b̂1,
b̂2, b̂3, and b̂N as follows:







































where κ = 2δγ
√
T/2 .
In the EB scheme, we find the corresponding parameter δ
in our EPR state, which gives the same output statistics for
the signal that goes to Bob, when Alice does a heterodyne
measurement on her state. It then turns out that to get an
identical output state we should satisfy δ =
√
(V + 1)/2 ,
where V = VA + 1.
Having obtained the output characteristic function, we can
find the corresponding output density matrix using (3). Then,
by tracing out the output mode b̂N and also performing photon-
detection measurements on modes b̂1 and b̂2—by introducing
the same measurement operator as in (12)—we find the
resultant joint state of â0 and b̂3 modes in the case of having
a successful event.
Appendix B provides the detailed calculations of the post-
measurement density matrix, and the corresponding CM pa-
rameters. It turns out that the CM of the shared bipartite state
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It is interesting to make the following observation. If the
EPR state is assumed totally uncorrelated, which happens
when its squeezing parameter goes to zero, both parts of the
state are left with vacuum states. Thus, if the QS is successful,
the output state of mode b̂3 should be a vacuum state as well.
This means that the CM of the end-to-end state is the identity
[9]. We verify that in the case of having a totally uncorrelated
EPR state, corresponding to δ = 1 and γ = 0, the expressions
above will indeed result in the identity matrix; that is, we
obtain a = b = 1 and c = 0.
In addition, as a result of the statistical equivalence between
EB and PM schemes, where δ =
√
(V + 1)/2 , we conclude
that F3 = F2. Now that the CM is known, we can upper bound
the Holevo information by using (44).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical simulations of the se-
cret key rate of the QS-amplified GG02 protocol and compare
it with that of the conventional one. We find the maximum
value for the lower bound in (23) by optimizing, at each
distance, the modulation variance, VA, or, equivalently, the
parameter δ in the EB scenario, as well as the QS parameter, µ,
which specifies the QS amplification gain. We also account for


























Fig. 7. QS-amplified EB CV QKD scheme. The quantum channel and the
QS are considered as a combined system with input modes â1 − â3 and âN
and output modes b̂1 − b̂3 and b̂N. The transformation matrix of the system
is given by (4).
that the quantum channel between the sender and receiver
is an optical fiber with loss factor α, whose transmittance
is given by T = 10−αL/10, where L is the channel length
and the loss factor is α = 0.2 dB/km corresponding to
standard optical fibers. Also, we assume β = 1 and that ideal
homodyne detection, with no electronic noise, is performed at
the receiver.
We first highlight the importance of accounting for the non-
Gaussian behavior of the QS by comparing the difference be-
tween the exact value of the mutual information function I⋆AB,
given by (24), and that obtained by Gaussian approximation,
IGAB, in (45). Fig. 8 shows both curves, versus distance, at no
excess noise. It is clear that the Gaussian approximation would
have overestimated the mutual information between Alice and
Bob at all distances considered, and that could have resulted
in wrong bounds for the key rate of QS-based systems.
Figure 9 shows the optimized secret key rates of both
conventional (solid lines) and the QS-assisted (dashed lines)
GG02 protocol versus distance, as well as that of the PLOB
bound for a repeaterless thermal-loss channel (labelled TL-
PLOB) [45]. This is the bound given in (23) of [45] at an
equivalent mean thermal photon number, n̄ = εtmT/(2(1 −



























Fig. 8. The exact mutual information function (dashed) as compared to its
Gaussian approximation (solid) versus distance at ε = 0. All other parameters
have been optimized.













































Fig. 9. The optimized secret key rate for the QS-amplified CV QKD protocol
versus distance, as compared to the rate of conventional GG02, and the upper
bound for a repeaterless thermal-loss channel (TL-PLOB) at a mean thermal
photon number of εrec/(2(1−T )). The solid lines represent the no-QS case
with top curve at εtm = 0, and the bottom one at εtm = 0.05, and the
middle curves covering εtm = 0.01− 0.04.
T )), to our receiver excess noise (here at εtm = 0.05). There
are several interesting observations that can be made in this
figure. First, we note that for all considered cases, there exists
a cross-over distance at which the QS-assisted curves surpass
their corresponding no-QS curves. At εtm = 0, this happens
at around 200 km. By increasing εtm, the cross-over distance
would drop and reaches around 150 km at εtm = 0.05.
This proves the key objective of our work that, by using
realistic NLAs, there would be certain regimes where NLA-
based systems improve the performance and the distance at
which secure keys can be exchanged.
It can be seen, in Fig. 9, that QS-equipped receivers may
not support high key rates at short distances. In fact, except
for the case of εtm = 0, we may not be able to exchange any
secret keys at very short distances for the QS-based system.
Even for the no excess noise case, there are over two orders of
magnitude difference between the no-QS and QS-based curves
at L = 0. This is attributed to multiple factors. First, the trade-
off between the choice of modulation variance and noise level
in the system, would require us to use very small values of
VA at short distances, otherwise the QS will not operate at
its low-noise regime. For instance, at L = 0, the optimum
value of VA for the QS-based system is 0.04. A no-QS system
with such a low value of VA also offers a low key rate of
2.83 × 10−2, which is comparable to what we obtain for the
QS-based system. Another factor is the success probability that
at L = 0 is around 0.5, and it almost linearly goes down to
around 0.15 at 200 km. One last factor is also the fact that the
QS is not entirely noise free. The additional noise by the QS
would further decrese the rate at L = 0. In addition to this,
if we have nonzero values of excess noise, a combination of
the above effects plus the external noise drive the key rate to
zero at very short distances. This is by itself is not a practical
dilemma, as, for a given channel length, one, in advance, can
figure out whether to use a QS or not. But, this can affect the
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TABLE I
OPTIMIZED VALUES FOR MODULATION VARIANCE AND AMPLIFICATION
GAIN AT ZERO EXCESS NOISE FOR THE QS-BASED SYSTEM.







applicability of QS modules in a CV quantum repeater system.
Another observation in Fig. 9 is that, at long distances, the
key rate for QS-based systems follows a parallel trend to that
of the TL-PLOB curve. For instance, at εtm = 0.05, the key
rate remains roughly one order of magnitude below the PLOB
bound for long distances. We have numerically verified that,
by optimizing system parameters, even for longer distances
than shown on the graph, we can obtain positive key rates,
albeit very low, for QS-assisted systems. The post-selection
mechanism in the QS seems to be the key to obtaining positive
key rates at long distances. At such distances, the channel
loss naturally prepares low-intensity inputs to the QS, which
allows us to use larger values of VA, as shown in Table I. That
would also enable us to use higher gains without necessarily
increasing the QS noise. A higher-than unity gain for the post-
selected states would then offer a better signal-to-noise ratio
at long distances, which allows us to achieve positive secret
key rates at longer distances than can otherwise be achieved
for a no-QS system.
Figure 9 also shows that our QS-amplified system cannot
beat the existing upper bound for repeaterless systems [45].
This agrees with the fact that any postprocessing at the receiver
side does not change the repeaterless nature of the link, even
though a form of amplification is in use. But, it will be
interesting to see if, based on the above results, we can assess
the practicality of the proposed CV repeater setups as in [27].
On the positive side, we can see that there exists a regime
of operation where the slope of the QS-based curves offer a
square root advantage as needed in repeater systems. On the
downside, however, this behaviour only appears in a limited
range of distance, and only up to a maximum value of excess
noise. In our simulations, we were not able to obtain any
positive secret key rates at εtm = 0.06, or higher. It seems
that once the starting distance at which QS-based curves offer
positive key rates lie above the maximum security distance for
no-QS systems, it is no longer possible to get a positive key
rate for QS-assisted systems. This may suggest that similar
limitations might affect the suitability of CV repeater systems
for QKD applications, which needs further investigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the performance of the GG02
protocol where the received signal was amplified by a quantum
scissor. We first obtained the exact output state and success
probability of the QS under study, which was later used
in calculating the secret key generation rate of the system.
We showed that the QS would turn a Gaussian input state
into a non-Gaussian one. That would make the conventional
techniques to estimating the key rate not directly applicable to
our case. We instead directly calculated the mutual information
by working out the probability distribution function of the
quadratures after the QS. Also, in order to calculate the leaked
information to Eve, we obtained the exact covariance matrix
of the bipartite state shared between sender and receiver labs
in the particular case of a Gaussian attack. We then found
the Holevo information corresponding to a Gaussian shared
output state with the same covariance matrix, which gives an
upper bound for the Holevo term in the case considered. We
optimized the key rate over input modulation variance and
amplification gain. Our results showed that, for a certain range
of excess noise, the QS-enhanced system could reach longer
distances than the no-QS system.
There are certain practical aspects that one should consider
before using quantum scissors in CV QKD. One assumption
that we make throughout our paper is that on-demand single-
photon sources are available for our scheme. There are two
practical issues, in this regard, that affect the performance of
the QS-based system. The first is the rate at which single-
photons are generated. The success rate of such sources
directly affect the key rate achievable. Secondly, we should
be cautious about the purity of the single-photon source
output. Multiple-photon components, in particular, could be
damaging to the performance of the QS. The good news is that
the current available technology for quantum-dot sources has
made a substantial progress to meet both above requirements.
In particular, quantum dot sources with efficiencies over 80%
and second-order coherence values < 0.004 have already been
demonstrated [46, 47]. The second issue is the reliance on
single-photon detectors, which will make CV QKD systems, in
terms of requirements, similar to their discrete-variable coun-
terparts. But, paying such prices may be unavoidable if one
wants to have long-distance CV QKD and/or CV repeaters.
Our study would, in particular, be highly relevant to analyzing
the performance of recently proposed CV quantum repeaters
[27], which rely on a similar building block. Moreover, one
should note that all these additional equipment are at the
receiver end of the CV-QKD link, which is often located at a
network node, shared among many users. This can bring the
total cost per user down to a reasonable value when the system
is in widespread use.
We conclude by pointing out two additional remarks. First,
note that, while the original NLA proposal by Ralph and
Lund relies on multiple QS modules, in our scheme, we find
using one QS is optimal as it minimizes the noise while
we can adjust the signal level by optimizing the modulation
variance. This also agrees with the results reported in [29],
where they have shown that the reverse coherent information
[48, 49] is maximum when one QS is used. Secondly, one
may wonder about the similarities versus differences of an
alternative approach to improving the rate-versus-distance be-
havior in CV QKD based on fighting noise by adding trusted
noise [48, 50, 51] with the NLA solution. While, in our QS-
based system, there are some elements of controlled noise by
injecting the vacuum state into the QS module we believe
that the key advantage of using a QS is in its underlying
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post-selected output. It will remain as an open question for
future research to determine which of the two solutions are
more effective in different scenarios, and if their impact can
be combined to come up with more loss-resilient CV QKD
implementations.
APPENDIX A
CONDITIONAL OUTPUT STATE ω̂PSout(xA)
In order to find the conditional output state when Alice has
used an X quadrature value of xA, we start with the input state
in (6), and take an average over PA with the input Gaussian






πVA/2 . As a result, the
output characteristic function in (8) will also be averaged out
and result in the following output state:
ω̂PSout(xA) =ω00(xA)|0〉b̂3〈0|+ ω01(xA)|0〉b̂3〈1|





























































PPS(xA) = ω̃00(xA) + ω̃11(xA).
APPENDIX B
COVARIANCE MATRIX ELEMENTS
Having obtained the output antinormally-ordered character-














χoutA (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξN)
D̂N(â0, ξ0)D̂N(b̂1, ξ1)D̂N(b̂2, ξ2)D̂N(b̂3, ξ3)D̂N(b̂N, ξN).
In the following, we show how the shared state between Alice
and Bob is found step-by-step. We first trace out mode b̂N,











χoutA (ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, 0)
D̂N(â0, ξ0)D̂N(b̂1, ξ1)D̂N(b̂2, ξ2)D̂N(b̂3, ξ3), (33)
where we used tr[D̂N(a, ξ)] = πδ
2(ξ). Next, by defining the
measurement operator M̂ = (✶− |0〉b1〈0|) ⊗ |0〉b2〈0|, modes































and PPSEB = P succ/2 is the corresponding success probability












Now, we find the CM for ρ̂PS03 . In doing so, we need to work
out the triplet (a, b, c) of the corresponding CM as follows. By
definition, assuming that x̂0 is the X quadrature of mode â0,
we have
























χ̃A(ξ0, 0)× tr(D̂N(â0, ξ0)x̂20). (39)












0) =− χ̃A(0, 0)−
d2
dy2




where we use the identity
∫
dzf(z) ddz δ(z) =
−
∫
dz ddz f(z)δ(z). Therefore,
a = −1−
d2



































Having the integrals in (36) taken, we are able to calculate
the triplet (a, b, c), thus the CM. Using MAPLE, we obtain the
closed form expressions as summarized in (30).
Having the triplet (a, b, c), χ⋆BE is upper bounded by:



















A2 − 4B2 )/2 = (
√
(a+ b)2 − 4c2 ±




a(ab− c2)/b , with A =
a2 + b2 − 2c2 and B = ab− c2. Note that (44) is valid when
we neglect the electronic noise at the receiver as we have
assumed in our numerical results. Also, mutual information
can be calculated form the covariance matrix, if we wish to






ab− c2 . (45)
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P. Michler, “On-demand generation of indistinguish-
able polarization-entangled photon pairs,” Nat. Photon.,
vol. 8, pp. 224–228, March 2014.
[47] P. Senellart, G. Solomon, and A. White, “High-
performance semiconductor quantum-dot single-photon
sources,” Nat. Nanotech., vol. 12, pp. 1026–1039, 2017.
[48] S. Pirandola, R. Garcı́a-Patrón, S. L. Braunstein, and
S. Lloyd, “Direct and reverse secret-key capacities of a
quantum channel,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 102, p. 050503,
Feb 2009.
[49] R. Garcı́a-Patrón, S. Pirandola, S. Lloyd, and J. H.
Shapiro, “Reverse coherent information,” Phys. Rev.
Lett., vol. 102, p. 210501, May 2009.
[50] R. Garcı́a-Patrón and N. J. Cerf, “Continuous-variable
quantum key distribution protocols over noisy channels,”
Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 102, p. 130501, Mar 2009. [Online].
Available: https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.
102.130501
[51] L. S. Madsen, V. C. Usenko, M. Lassen, R. Filip,
and U. L. Andersen, “Continuous variable quantum key
distribution with modulated entangled states,” Nature
Communications, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 1083, 2012. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms2097
Masoud Ghalaii received the B.Sc. degree in chemical
engineering from the Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan,
Iran, in 2011, and the M.Sc. degree in physics from the Sharif
13
University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, in 2014. From January
to June 2015, he was working, as a stagiaire student, on optical
receivers for quantum communication at Télécom-ParisTech, Paris,
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